Exercise is Medicine: Some Cautionary Remarks in Principle as Well as in Practice by Neville, Ross
Technological University Dublin 
ARROW@TU Dublin 
Articles School of Hospitality Management and Tourism 
2012 
Exercise is Medicine: Some Cautionary Remarks in Principle as 
Well as in Practice 
Ross Neville 
Technological University Dublin, ross.neville2@student.dit.ie 
Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/tfschhmtart 
 Part of the Sports Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Neville, R.D. (2012) Exercise is medicine: Some cautionary remarks in principle as well as in practice, 
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy. doi:10.1007/s11019-012-9383-y 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the School of Hospitality Management and Tourism at 
ARROW@TU Dublin. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Articles by an authorized administrator of ARROW@TU 
Dublin. For more information, please contact 
yvonne.desmond@tudublin.ie, arrow.admin@tudublin.ie, 
brian.widdis@tudublin.ie. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License 
1 
 
Exercise is medicine: Some cautionary remarks in principle as 
well as in practice 
Ross D. Neville 
Dublin Institute of Technology 
 
Abstract    
On the basis of extensive research on the relationship between physical activity, exercise 
and health, as well as strong support from policymakers and practitioners, the “Exercise is 
Medicine” initiative has become something of a linchpin in the agenda for modern healthcare 
reform and reflects a broader acceptance that the philosophy of health politics must shift 
from social engineering to performativity. However, in spite of the avowed commitment to 
encouraging individuals to take on a more reflexive relation to their health, it remains unclear 
as to whether an initiative such as this is, unambiguously, a good thing. In this paper, a 
number of cautionary remarks are made with respect to “Exercise is Medicine” in principle as 
well as in practice. Firstly, it is argued that equating exercise with medicine is to equate it 
with a definition of and relation to the body to which it is not entirely akin. And secondly, it is 
argued that any proposed alignment of the fitness and healthcare industries needs further 
critical examination, a realigning of interests, and a thorough reconsideration of their 
suitability of fit. 
Keywords   “Exercise is medicine” · health and fitness · object- vs. subject-centred risk · 






If, as Foucault (1980, 1995, 1998) explained, each historical epoch has specific ways of 
producing the kinds of bodies that align with its needs as an economic system, then the 
burgeoning “Exercise is Medicine” initiative is a prime example of how individuals are now 
encouraged to act as autonomous and responsibly-informed, make cost-benefit analyses of 
life-options, and take on a more reflexive relation to their health. On the basis of extensive 
research on the relationship between physical activity and health, as well as strong support 
from policymakers and practitioners, this initiative has become not only a linchpin in the 
agenda for modern healthcare reform but a reflection of the broader acceptance that the 
philosophy of health politics must shift from social engineering to performativity. That 
“Exercise is Medicine” is now something of a platitude is a testament, not only to the 
cogency of this claim, but to its growing advocacy and the fact that it has become 
conceptually embedded within our system of formal and informal inferences with respect to 
health. 
In spite of the avowed commitment to encouraging a change in the behavioural and 
lifestyle trajectories of modern individuals, however, it remains unclear as to whether an 
initiative such as this is, unambiguously, a good thing. This is not only because the remit of 
concern to which it extends is broader than the medical and scientific relations of its 
production, but because the possibility of its critical examination is almost entirely negated 
for the most important of those involved in its uptake and implementation – its participants.  
The purpose of this paper is to draw on a number of important sociological and 
philosophical insights in order to make cautionary remarks with respect to “Exercise is 
Medicine”. It will do so in two ways. The first section highlights a number of important 
distinctions that problematise the equating of exercise and medicine in principle. It will be 
argued that “exercise” and “medicine” appeal to quite different concerns with, and relations 
to, the body and that equating exercise with medicine is to equate it to a definition of the 
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body and standards of reference to which it is not entirely akin. On the basis of this logical 
distinction, the second aspect of this paper reconsiders the assertions made by Sallis’ (2009) 
that (i) the fitness and healthcare worlds seldom interact, and that (ii) on the basis of the 
“Exercise is Medicine” initiative, there should be a merging of the fitness industry with the 
healthcare industry. It will be argued firstly that (i) is not entirely true and, secondly, that, 
although the imperative of (ii) has clear merits that will be highlighted, it needs further critical 
examination and must be approached with caution. The paper concludes by highlighting 
some avenues for future research and debate and considerations for practice. 
Considering exercise and medicine as relations to the body 
Although the launch of the initiative proper was precipitated by a number of related previous 
studies of the same name (Bryant and Peterson 2006; Burnham 1998; Elrick 1996), 
“Exercise is Medicine” is now largely synonymous with the collaborative project initiated by 
the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American College of Sports Medicine 
(ACSM) in 2007 in order to encourage a change in healthcare provision towards the 
prevention of disease through exercise (Jonas and Phillips 2009; see also Pearce 2008; 
Sallis 2009). The initiative came to the fore on the back of the widely held assumption that 
mainstream medical practice had largely ignored the value of exercise and that there was 
significant potential for making its assessment and prescription a standard part of the 
modern treatment paradigm.1 On this basis, it calls for physicians and other related clinical 
healthcare professionals to commit to the advocacy and advancement of the principles of 
exercise, to use patient activity levels as a vital sign in helping to lower the risk of all-cause 
mortality (principally cardiovascular disease, hypertension, diabetes, and obesity), and to do 
so in a structured and controlled manner. “Exercise is Medicine” is now something of a 
global phenomenon. In 2010, for example, the initiative held its first World Congress and 
hosted delegates from 60 countries outside of the U.S. (its country of origin). In addition to 
this, and at the Second Annual World Congress in 2011, the “Exercise is Medicine Global 
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Health Care Declaration” was introduced in order to further position the initiative at the 
forefront of the disease treatment and prevention paradigm on the back of the following 
claim: Exercise on prescription is the world’s prescription for health. 
In order to explore the implications of this initiative and the slogan “Exercise is 
Medicine” more specifically, it will be useful to consider the relation to the body that each of 
these terms have generally presupposed. Basic word association will reveal that “Exercise is 
to Medicine” as “Fitness is to Health” and, taken in this manner, it can be seen that “Exercise 
is Medicine” is a logical and practical extension of the assumption that fitness leads to 
health. To put it another way, “Exercise is Medicine” is a logical and practical extension of 
the assumption that “being fit” invariably implies “being healthy”. This is a position that is well 
rehearsed in the sports/exercise science literature and might usefully be referred to as the 
hierarchical model. It implies treating “fitness” and “health” in a discrete manner, as 
belonging to the same order of causality, and that fitness is oriented towards health as its 
higher-order construct. This hierarchical relation between fitness and health is scarcely 
contested and can be phrased thusly: physical activity and exercise contribute to fitness 
which contributes to positive health outcomes (or overall wellbeing).2 
 From the perspective of the sociology of body/sociology of health and illness in 
particular, this is a problematic connection. This is not merely for the well known fact that not 
all fitness activities are good for one’s health, but also because aligning fitness and health is 
deeply political (see e.g. Glassner 1989, 1990; Markula 1997, 1998; Pronger 2002; Smith 
Maguire 2008a; White et al. 1995). Although the sections that follow will discuss the political 
implications of this connection in more detail, it will be helpful for the purposes of the present 
section to focus on the observation that, although they are often used synonymously (or 
have come to be used almost synonymously), “fitness” and “health” (and thus exercise and 
medicine) appeal to quite different concerns with, and relations to the body (Bauman 1998, 
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2000, 2001, 2005; Bauman and May 2001; Glassner 1989, 1990). The following sections 
illustrate a number of conditions under which this appears to be the case. 
Health and fitness: From object-centred to subject-centred risk 
A useful context for framing the shift in emphasis from health to fitness (and hence from 
medicine to exercise) is the one that has occurred from dangerousness to risk. While various 
theorists have discussed the centrality of the concept of risk to the configuration of modern 
societies (Beck 1992; Giddens 1990, 1991), it is Castels (1991) who has argued quite 
specifically that risk has become autonomous from danger. “A risk”, Castels (ibid, p. 287) 
explains, “does not arise from the presence of a particular precise danger embodied in a 
concrete individual or group”. Rather, with risk “[i]t is the effect of a combination of abstract 
factors which render more or less probable the occurrence of undesirable modes of 
behaviour [or outcomes]”. For Castels, the shift from dangerousness to risk is based on the 
Foucauldian premise that power is “not to be sought in the...existence of a central point”, but 
in the “complex strategical situation in a particular society” (Foucault 1998, p. 93). For 
Castels then, risk is incompatible with the type of substantialism presupposed by danger. 
That is to say, unlike danger which is localised, risk is thoroughly relational.  
Despite the sociological context of its development, this is more than an abstract 
observation. For example, modernisation, which has brought with it significant advances in 
biomedical science and technology, has facilitated a shift away from the dangers of, say, 
acute and infectious diseases to a heightened awareness of, and anxiety with respect to, the 
risks of noncommunicable conditions that are chronic and degenerative in character. Modern 
epidemics quite clearly reflect this shift. According to Boero (2010), modern epidemics 
problematise the traditional paradigm of cause and effect given their lack of a clear 
pathological base. The moral panic that accompanies Type 2 diabetes, heart disease, and 
obesity, for example, is explained by the fact that modern bodies are always potentially at 
risk; not necessarily to some pathogen external to them, but to their very composition. Risk 
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produces its effects from the inside out and not merely the other way round as was 
traditionally the case. That is to say, risk is subject-centred as opposed to dangerousness 
which is object-centred. It is everywhere in modern society, not because it embraces 
everything, but because it potentially comes from everywhere. 
This shift has, in a very significant way, prefigured the shift in emphasis from health 
to fitness (and hence from medicine to exercise). As Petersen (1997 p. 195) explains, “the 
distinction between healthy and unhealthy populations [has] totally dissolve[d] since 
everything potentially is a source of ‘risk’ and everyone can be seen to be ‘at risk’”. Just as 
dangerousness and risk appeal to quite different concerns with the body, so too do health 
and fitness. Health corresponds to dangerousness (or object-centred risk) in that it is 
concerned with the body at stasis. Threats to the normal functioning of the healthy body are 
treated as alien presences to its mechanistic structure which exert upon individuals a telic 
demand, to use Leder’s (1990) phrasing. These object-centred risks, once imposed on the 
healthy body, are to be meliorated reactively, and in a deductive manner. In the following 
passage, Baron (1992; see also Leder 1992) offers a useful explanation of how these object-
centred risks are treated at the level of practice: 
[P]hysicians are trained to regard the body as an impediment to diagnosis...[T]he 
living body of the patient presents an obstruction that hides a deeper truth. It is a 
translucent screen on which the silhouette of disease is projected; the 
physician’s task is to render the patient’s body (and the patient) transparent so 
that true disease can be directly apprehended...The body as a physical object 
like all other physical objects becomes a literal metaphor for clinicians...Disease 
becomes an act of struggle with the body, the art of comprehending bodily 
characteristics so that they can be subtracted from the “clinical presentation” 
leaving one the clearest view of the disease (Baron 1992, p. 38). 
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This is not necessarily the case with fitness. Fitness presupposes anything but the 
body at stasis. Rather, with fitness, one’s body is to be lived through, not merely lived with. 
In fact, with fitness, it is not so much the case that I have a body. Rather, as Marcel (1977, p. 
100) so eloquently put it, “my body it mine in so far as for me my body is not an object but, 
rather, I am my body”. Fitness presupposes what Merleau-Ponty (2002; see also Edwards 
1998; Leder 1990, 1998) referred to as the living body, one that is wholly animated and 
presupposes itself as a body-subject. To be fit or to engage in fitness activities is to be in the 
business of disease prevention. It is to be in the business of risk management and reduction, 
an inductive process that is undertaken in and through the body with a view to preserving or 
restoring its vitality.  As such, with fitness the telic demand to which Leder refers is 
ceaselessly imposed upon the body since there only exists the threat of an alien presence; 
or rather, since there always exists the threat of an alien presence. Fitness, as a desirable 
bodily state then, provides the first line of defence in the face of subject-centred risks that 
are to be obviated in a proactive manner. As Bauman (1998, p. 23) explained, being fit 
implies “being always on the move”. It means having a “flexible, absorptive and adjustable 
body, ready to live through sensations [that are] impossible to specify in advance” (Bauman 
2000, p. 77). It implies “being ready for all challenges, and [being] indifferent to the nature of 
any task it may confront” (Bauman 1992, p. 31). In fact, even in the absence of any concrete 
external threat imposed upon the body, fitness takes on the character of covering all of one’s 
bases in the face of unremitting ambivalence and ontological insecurity. That is to say, far 
from being merely concerned with health and being subject to risks acting on the body, with 
fitness, modern individuals have become engaged as subjects of risk both in and through 
their bodies. 
Exercise was medicine: From what is a body? to what can a body do? 
Whereas health follows a typically substantive logic insofar as its locus of knowledge is 
abstracted from context and foregrounded in the material configuration of individual bodies, 
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fitness implies being fit for something or, perhaps more insidiously, fit for someone. Unlike 
health, fitness orients individuals primarily towards the future in an instrumental sense. With 
fitness, one no longer merely speaks of the baseline requirements of the body but of its 
potential – to affect and to be affected. And on this basis, in advanced modern societies 
there is an overwhelming shift away from concerns about health and effects imposing upon 
the normal functioning of the body to concerns with the body’s fitness and the constitution of 
new sets of affective relations. That is, it is not only the case that advanced modern societies 
engage their members in an active rather than a passive manner. Rather, they also require a 
shift in emphasis from body-object to body-subject, from having a body to being one’s body, 
and from the passive consumption of expert medical discourses to the active production of 
their embodied and creative destinies. That is to say, in a manner akin to that outlined in 
Spinoza’s Ethics, they require a shift in emphasis in life orientation from the question What is 
a body? to the question What can a body do? (Buchanan 1997; Deleuze and Guattari 1987; 
Fox 2002). The bases for the attribution of a logical distinction between health and fitness 
are highlighted in the following table: 
Table 1. On the logical distinctions between health and fitness 
 
“Health” “Fitness” 
Type of risk engendered Object-centred Subject-centred 
Orientation to the body Epistemological Ontological 
Concern with the body Baseline requirements  
(What is a body?) 
(Effects) 
Potential  
(What can a body 
do?) 
(Affects) 
Type of body presupposed Body-object Body-subject 
Relation to the body Having a body Being one’s body 
Role to be undertaken Passive consumer Active producer 
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Aims of health context Social engineering Performativity 
Whereas the “Exercise is Medicine” initiative is certainly reflective of this shift in the 
health context from social engineering towards performativity, it is unclear as to whether or 
not it goes far enough. That is to say at the very least, on this account of the dual character 
of the body and the types of risk it now presupposes, it seems as though there may be 
broader issues of commensurability that have been largely ignored (see McNamee 2005). 
The table outlined above certainly provides a useful frame within which this question of 
commensurability might be considered in the future. However, taken to its extreme, and for 
the purposes of argument here, it might even seem instructive on the basis of these 
distinctions to regard health as having fallen into a class that prominent sociologist Ulrich 
Beck has referred to as “zombie categories” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002; Beck and 
Willms 2004). 
[T]he sociological imagination is now inhabited by zombie categories. They haunt 
our thinking. They focus our attention on realities that are steadily disappearing. 
And they haunt our empirical work, because even the subtlest empirical work, 
when framed in zombie categories, becomes blind empiricism. Zombie 
categories embody nineteenth-century horizons of experience...And because 
these inappropriate horizons...still mould our perceptions, they are blinding us 
to...real experience[s] and the[ir] ambiguities (Beck and Willms 2004, p. 19). 
Is health a zombie category? Has it lost its conceptual and explanatory powers? Well, 
much debate would be needed in order to gain consensus on such a claim. What is clear, 
however, is the fact that modern conceptions of the body in general and modern epidemics 
in particular exist in an awkward relation to health. In fact, that modern epidemics are framed 
as the major health problems of our time is something of a logical misnomer. Is it not the 
case that modern epidemics problematise health? Is it not something of a category mistake 
to say that “Exercise is Medicine”? Might it be the case in the future that we stop talking 
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about how “Exercise is Medicine”, reflect back on the shift that occurred “From Medicine to 
Exercise”, and perhaps even talk about the fact that, for a great period in our intellectual 
history, “Exercise was Medicine”? Probably not. But the possibility that traditional 
conceptions of health, and thus medical practice, are focusing our attention on realities that 
are steadily disappearing is thought-provoking nonetheless.  
Health and fitness: A confluence of interests? 
On the basis of the foregoing, there are two quite specific statements in Sallis’ (2009) paper, 
“Exercise is medicine and physicians need to prescribe it!”, that should be less self-evident 
than they appear to be. Taking them in the reverse order that they are outlined in the paper, 
Sallis (ibid, p. 4) asks “Why does th[e] fitness world seldom intersect with the healthcare 
world?” and, on this basis, states that “It is clear to me that we must begin to merge the 
fitness industry with the healthcare industry if we are going to improve world health” (ibid). 
The following two sections are given to the analysis of this question and follow-up statement, 
respectively, and mark a number of useful clarifications, considerations, and issues for 
practice. 
The healthcare and fitness worlds: A case of “never the twain shall meet”? 
The premise that the fitness and healthcare worlds do not intersect is, in a certain sense, 
clearly untrue. According to Smith Maguire (2008a, b), the legitimacy of the fitness industry 
is largely parasitic upon endorsements from the health field. In fact, the fitness industry is 
perhaps unparalleled in terms of the level of endorsements that it receives from fields 
external to, and independent of it. In a more fundamental sense, however, it can also be 
seen that the fitness field quite clearly hangs on to the “epistemological coat-tails” (Morall 
2009, p. 96) of the broader field of health medical discourse. That is to say, that fitness and 
health speak to quite different relations to the body is scarcely acknowledged in the 
sports/exercise science literature. That fitness also routinely functions as a universal, and 
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thus objective, resource of judging the adequacy of modern bodies is a testament to the 
proximity between these two fields of practice. The organisation of the fitness field as an 
official scientific discourse has, in fact, relied heavily on the development of systems of 
classification and diagnostic procedures that it has adapted from the health field. It too 
combines examination and observation in order to codify its subject and, in conjunction with 
its confessional practices, procedural examinations and interventions, seeks to reduce the 
frequency with which deviation from the norm occurs. This is a model that is clearly inherited 
from the broader field of health. And one might go even further than Smith Maguire and say 
that the fitness field is not merely legitimised by the health field but is dependent on it for 
many of its terms and frames of reference.  
The notion that the fitness and healthcare worlds seldom intersect cannot be totally 
true because they are bound together in a labyrinth of formal and informal relations. A more 
fitting question to ask on the basis of the foregoing is to what extent the fitness field is guilty 
of a methodological atavism on the back of its alignment to standards of reference to which it 
is not entirely akin. As was highlighted in the previous section, is there not a 
commensurability issue at stake between the body (-object) of health and the body (-subject) 
that fitness presupposes? It is questions such as these that appear particularly timely and 
worthy of being addressed for future clarification. It is insufficient to treat the problem of the 
relation of fitness and health as merely empirical, which is commonplace. To continue to do 
this is to proceed in a largely unreflexive manner and, as a consequence, without due 
consideration for the narrative field as a whole. 
In a broader sense, Sallis is quite right to observe that the fitness and healthcare 
worlds seldom intersect. That is, it is quite right to observe that there is something of a 
functional separation at play. This functional separation, however, is more than naively or 
uncritically maintained and it would be remiss to overlook the political agenda that might be 
at stake here. The risk context is worth underscoring again here. The opening up of a market 
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for fitness products and services, and its relative autonomy from the health field, represents 
a shift away from what Giddens and Pierson (1998, p. 163) referred to as “external risk” – 
the presumption that the state will intervene and protect its citizens when things go wrong – 
to a more active “reflexive risk environment” under which people are encouraged to establish 
a different relationship to their social an economic conditions. The relative autonomy of these 
fields is fuelled by a decades-old agenda to shed an economic burden (one that is 
compounded by changing demographics and increasing demands) and is essential to the 
maintenance of an environment under which individuals are encouraged to act as 
autonomous, responsibly-informed individuals who make cost-benefit assessments of life 
options. In fact, as Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) have explained, this individualising 
trend is not a social condition arrived at by the decisions of willing individuals. Rather, in our 
modern social configuration, “people are condemned to individualization” (ibid, p. 4). That 
the fitness and healthcare worlds do not fully intersect enables the latter to absolve from a 
traditional interventionist role by encouraging an increasingly privatised attitude towards risk 
and an inversion in the burden of responsibility onto individuals and individual behaviours. 
Taking Sallis’ (2009, p. 3) assertion that “[t]he three major factors that influence our health 
and longevity are genetics, the environment and behaviour” then, it is clear that it is the latter 
that has been deemed the most economically prudent area for the development of health 
policy. 
“Exercise is medicine”: Consumption myopia, leisure, and the obligation of self work 
On the basis of the foregoing, it should be clear that Sallis’ recommendation that there 
should be a merging of the fitness and healthcare industry is less self-evident than initially 
supposed. For one, what is meant by this merger, and what it would involve specifically? The 
benefits of such a merger to the healthcare industry seem to be already well articulated. 
However, whether they extend a great deal beyond mere economic factors is much less 
clear. At the policy level, for example, the emphasis on individual behaviours, personal 
13 
 
choice, and increased levels of consumption as opposed to an emphasis on environmental 
and infrastructural factors does little to alleviate this scepticism. That is to say, the bases for 
emphasising the former appear little more than economically driven, especially since the 
latter could be deemed much less attractive in that they would likely require a heavy 
strategic investment in resources and development initiatives at the level of the material 
environment.  
Given the magnitude of the scale of difference between the private and public 
provision of fitness services, the benefits to the fitness industry over and above economic 
factors are even less clear. For example, a merger would seem to align more closely with 
the interests of the public provision of services than it would with the private sector and it is 
unclear as to how this distinction could be negotiated. That is to say, while a merger 
between the public provision of fitness and healthcare services could potentially result in the 
establishment of a broader range of shared, social and community-based performance 
indicators as standards of reference and success (and this, of course, would be something 
to aspire to), it is unclear as to whether their private corollaries are wont to take leave of their 
emphasis on the logic of consumption, not least their economic myopia. To be sure, there 
has been an increasing emphasis on innovation between both industries through calls for 
collaborative research and practice (e.g. the €4.2m made available from the ESRC in July 
2011 to work towards increasing healthy life expectancy in the EU by 2020), the 
development and rolling out of activity initiatives and referral schemes (general initiatives as 
well as more focused referral schemes such “Exercise is Medicine”, or the GP Exercise 
Referral Scheme as they are also known as), as well as a significant improvement in terms 
of the standards of regulation and practice with respect to the level of professionalism within 
the fitness industry (such as the agreed upon code of ethical practice that forms the basis for 
the Register of Exercise Professionals, or “REPS”). However, it is unclear as to whether any 
of these will contribute significantly towards making access to fitness and healthcare 
services less differentially available. And this, it seems, should form the very foundation of 
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such a collaborative programme. What seems more likely is that a broad scale merger would 
continue to involve serious compromises to get both sides on board and, thus, proceed at 
the expense of the social context that inspired it in the first place.  
The final consideration pertains more specifically to the role and effect of an initiative 
such as “Exercise is Medicine” under such a merger. The public hopes for such a project will 
not only be met with the reality that the modern fitness context is heavily privatised through 
fee-based membership, but is also privatised in the sense that its activities are undertaken in 
the context of leisure time (Sassatelli 1999a; Smith Maguire 2008a). “Exercise is Medicine”, 
however, appears to impose an instrumental rationality upon exercising and it is unclear as 
to whether it would do so at the expense of those expressive characteristics often associated 
with leisure. That is to say, “Exercise is Medicine”, as it is presently conceived, seems to 
construct a sphere in which the freedom to engage in expressive activities is replaced by 
what Smith Maguire (2008b, p. 59) referred to as the “obligation of self work”. This 
naturalisation of exercising and self-work as leisure is problematic for some (Rojek 2010; 
Smith Maguire 2008a, b). For example, one might ask quite specifically to what extent 
“Exercise is Medicine” is an imposition on peoples’ leisure time? At an even broader level, 
one might ask to what extent the cultural imagery of leisure, recast through the lens of such 
initiatives, would require a shift in emphasis and the inculcation of values traditionally 
associated with work. Would this make exercising less likely to be framed as a leisure 
experience? These are question that deserve further examination because, although 
“Exercise is Medicine” exists in an uneasy relation to leisure, those practices prescribed 
seem to have been naturalised as leisure activities (Smith Maguire 2008a, b).3 
Due consideration to how the “Exercise is Medicine” initiative is promoted in the 
future and the types of values that it is thought to engender should be of primary concern. 
This is especially important insofar as there is a danger that, by instrumentalizing leisure 
time through the obligation of self-work, exercising might be rendered meaningless except 
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as a means of acquiring values that are external to it (MacIntyre 2007; McNamee 1994). It 
would be particularly useful to address how the expressivity of exercise as it is undertaken in 
leisure time might be reconciled with the instrumental character of the “Exercise is Medicine” 
initiative. The extent to which such programmes can orient individuals towards the types of 
expressive features that are internal to the practice of exercise, it seems, will not only be 
critical factors to the initiative’s success but to its longevity as well. 
Conclusion 
I hope it is clear at this point that the intention in problematising “Exercise is Medicine” was 
not at all polemical. Rather, in questioning this connection, I hope to have shown that the 
types of bodies to which each of these terms refer are quite apart from each other in terms of 
their relation to the individual and to society, and to risk in particular. On this basis I hope to 
have shown that, with the term “Exercise is Medicine”, there is actually a tension where what 
is being sought is a confluence. As a philosophy for tackling the problems of modern health, 
it seems as though the future of the “Exercise is Medicine” initiative is not only reliant on a 
seemingly simple realigning of interests between the fitness and healthcare industries, but 
on a thorough philosophical reconsideration in the future of the terms themselves and their 
suitability of fit. 
Looking beyond this paper, it is clear that future consideration is needed in order to 
highlight and clarify the asymmetries that are at play in an initiative such as “Exercise is 
Medicine”. And, perhaps the most important question to be asked of it going forward is to 
what extent the objectives of such a programme are produced in the service of broader 
political and economic interests? While “Exercise is Medicine” is indeed framed as a 
voluntarist project, the imposition of socially borne risk onto individual leisure time is not a 
social condition that is arrived at by individuals in a voluntarist manner. It is, quite frankly, an 
imposition of what Bourdieu and Passeron (1977, p. 4) have referred to as “symbolic 
violence”. An initiative such as “Exercise is Medicine” needs to do more than direct socially 
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borne risk onto individuals and direct them towards the market for its relief. That is, they 
need to do more than make the problems of health problems about mere increases in 
consumption activity. This is not only an imperative because of the social implications that 
underpin such an initiative, but because there is a potential for it to attract much attention on 
the basis of lucrative economic exchanges that it could likely engender. In order that this 
might be avoided, the future of “Exercise is Medicine” would likely benefit from exploring 
further the possibilities for defining its mission on more egalitarian and developmental terms. 
It would benefit from a shift in emphasis from mere consumption activity to experience. That 
is, from a shift in emphasis from the narrow goal of improving fitness through individual 
activity to the broader goal of improving the relations of fit individuals experience between 
themselves and their social-material environments.  
Notes 
1. For a general overview, see www.exerciseismedicine.org. It is also worth noting that, 
outside of the U.S., comparable initiatives have been referred to as GP referral schemes. 
For example, in Ireland, the “GP Exercise Referral Programme” is the name for the joint 
scheme that is being undertaken in conjunction with the Institute of Leisure and Amenity 
Management (ILAM), the Health Service Executive (HSE), and the Irish College of 
General Practitioners (ICGP). 
2. Although the relation of fitness and health to wellbeing is not of primary concern here, it 
seems as though this also represents a useful conceptual problem for future 
consideration. 
3. A number of recent studies, for example, suggest that emphasising the instrumental and 
beneficial outcomes of exercising can act, somehow paradoxically, as a barrier to the 
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